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major shift in chapter 11 practice in the past
decade has been the emergence of hedge
funds that specialize in investing in distressed debt. Their presence in the reorganization
of large firms is pervasive: In 2009 and 2010, they
invested in more than 70 percent of the chapter 11
cases of large firms.1 Distressed hedge funds wield
more than $100 billion in capital and aim to use
their expertise in the bankruptcy process to profit
from investing in the claims of large distressed
firms.2 To that end, they deploy both active and passive investing strategies. While recent research has
shed some light on the impact of these funds on the
bankruptcy process, much remains unknown.
In a recent paper,3 the author conducted the first
study of one of the most important active-investing
strategies: Buying lower-priority claims like unsecured debt and equity and hiring lawyers to participate
in the bankruptcy process (hereinafter, the “study”).
This strategy is referred to as “junior activism.” Junior
activists are well-known for their willingness to challenge managers and senior creditors in the boardroom
and courtroom. Like activists investing more generally, junior activism is a source of controversy.
Critics view junior activists as opportunists
that file meritless motions and objections to extract
hold-up value settlements. To quote Wilbur Ross
in his testimony to the ABI Commission to Study
the Reform of Chapter 11, “[junior creditors] know
that terrorist [litigation] tactics can lead to concessions from economically superior claimants and that
even when they don’t, litigation sometimes results
in decisions that bestow value on the nominally
lower-ranking class.”4 In theory, this frivolous litigation is also thought to increase bankruptcy costs,
undermining the chapter 11 policy goal of maximizing creditor recoveries.
Junior activists, on the other hand, believe that
they counter the perverse incentives of managers of
chapter 11 debtors. Chapter 11 leaves managers in
1 This finding emerges from the empirical study that this paper summarizes. While the
author cannot identify what percentage of the claims they held, the classes of debt they
invested in had a face value in excess of $180 billion.
2 See “Hedge Fund Industry — Assets under Management,” BarclayHedge, available at www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF_Money_Under_
Management.html (showing distressed hedge funds have managed over $100 billion in
assets since 2006; unless otherwise indicated, all links in this article were last visited on
Nov. 23, 2015).
3 Jared A. Ellias, “Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter
11?,” Forthcoming 2015, Journal of Legal Analysis, available at jla.oxfordjournals.org/
content/early/2015/09/12/jla.lav010.full.pdf.
4 Remarks of Wilbur L. Ross to the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11
during ABI’s Annual Spring Meeting, April 19, 2013 (National Harbor, Md.), available at
commission.abi.org.
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control of the bankruptcy process and requires them
to maximize creditor recoveries. In performing this
duty, managers face what economists call a “moral
hazard”: If the firm is reorganized in a transaction
that is appraised at a discount to the firm’s true
value, managers and senior creditors can profit at
the expense of junior claimants by extracting value
that would go to junior constituencies if the process
was run fairly. Junior activists claim that they intervene to stop managers and senior creditors from
exploiting their control over the bankruptcy process
to enrich themselves at the expense of junior claimants. Which of these views is accurate?
This article summarizes the main results from
the study. Obviously, it is not possible to generalize and say that junior activists are always acting
in line with the predictions of their detractors or
that they never are. In reality, both views of junior
activism are probably correct in individual cases,
and anecdotal evidence supports both positions.
The study moves the debate forward by using
quantitative tools to try to estimate the average
effect of junior activism across a sizable sample of
bankruptcy cases. The two views of junior activism provide different testable empirical predictions
about junior activism.
If the criticism of junior activism is accurate,
junior activism is expected to be correlated with settlements outside of the absolute priority rule (suggesting that the junior activist might have received
hold-up value), and we would expect to see increases in bankruptcy costs. If junior activists are correct,
junior activism is expected to be associated with an
increase in the appraised value of the restructuring
transaction, implying higher creditor recoveries and
allocation of the firm’s value in line with the absolute priority rule.
These predictions were taken to a hand-collected
dataset of 107 large firms that filed for chapter 11 in
2009-10. To measure junior activism, a methodology
was developed that could be referred to as a “litigation score.” The intuition behind this research design
is that portions of junior activism could be observed
systematically in all bankruptcy cases: The litigation, their court victories and the identity of junior
activists were treated as a proxy for the things that
could not be reliably observed, such as out-of-court
negotiations. The more litigation — the objections to
the debtor’s key motions, requests for judicial relief
like motions to appoint trustees and examiner — the
ABI Journal

higher the score. The methodology is explained in greater
detail in the study, but it generally allowed one to distinguish
the cases where junior activists were relatively more active
from the ones where they appeared to play less of a role.
Table 1 summarizes observed junior activist litigation.
Let’s review the findings that are consistent with the
view that junior activists play an important role in corporate governance that is consistent with bankruptcy policy
goals. First, the evidence suggests that junior activist
litigation is associated with an increase in the appraised
value of the restructuring transaction. This supports the
view that junior activists positively impact chapter 11.
Depending on the facts of the case, the junior activist
might have increased the appraised transaction value by
pushing a reluctant management team into a transaction
that maximized the firm’s true value. Alternatively, the
junior activist might have prevented management and
Table 1: Litigation Activity of Junior Activists
Objections to Management’s
Major Motions

Filed
n

%

Finance Motion

35

32.71%

Disclosure Statement

40

37.38%

Sale Motion

18

16.82%

Reorganization Plan

21

19.63%

Junior Activist Extraordinary
Requests for Relief

Filed
n

Appoint Examiner

Granted
%

8

n

7.48%

%
1

0.93%

Appoint Trustee

2

1.87%

0

0.00%

Terminate Exclusivity

5

4.67%

1

0.93%

12

11.21%

8

7.48%

4

3.74%

60

56.07%

Appoint Additional Official Committee
File Own Plan
Identity of Junior Activist

n
Hedge Fund or Private-Equity
Firm Observed

%

senior lenders from obtaining an artificially low appraisal from their investment banker. In addition, the market
prices of senior claims at the end of the bankruptcy process were examined and no evidence was found that the
observed increase in the appraisal results in the firm being
overvalued and senior creditors undercompensated.
Second, a calculation of the market value of the firm’s
outstanding debt and equity on the date that the firm filed
for bankruptcy was obtained by using a subset of the study’s
data. This allowed the study to control for the market’s
recovery expectations at the beginning of the bankruptcy
process. Controlling for changes in credit market conditions
and other important variables, junior activism appears to be
positively correlated with the bankruptcy process, producing
higher creditor recoveries than the market anticipated prior to
the bankruptcy process. This suggests that junior activists are
at least savvy investors. It also provides support for the view
that they contribute expertise that improves the outcome of
the bankruptcy process.
Third, bond and loan returns were examined around key
bankruptcy hearings, and a single relationship between posthearing returns for junior claimholders and the presence of
a junior activist was found. This correlation appears to be
driven by the junior activist’s prosecution of objection to
management’s motions. While more data would be needed
to come to firm conclusions, the observed increase in the
value of the junior claim does not appear to be a transfer
from senior creditors. This finding is also consistent with
the notion that junior activists play a crucial governance role
that checks management’s powers as a debtor in possession
at important points in the bankruptcy process.
Fourth, the firms that recapitalized with supporting
investment banker appraisals were examined to look for evidence of junior activist influence. These investment bankers
calculated a range of estimated value, with a high, low and
mid-point estimate. The range appears to be narrower for the
cases with junior activist involvement, which is consistent
with the notion that junior activists contribute expertise that
reduces the randomness of the appraisal process and, together with the evidence of higher appraisals, is broadly consiscontinued on page 62

Table 2: Estimated Value of Distributions Outside of Absolute Priority in Favor of Junior Activists
Estimated Value
Consideration

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Standard Deviation

Warrants (n=17) / Cash (n=5)
Value of Cash (n=5)

900,000

11,000,000

6,380,000

7,000,000

3,615,522

% Total Enterprise Value (n=5)

1.00%

4.80%

3.02%

2.43%

1.73%

% Funded Debt (n=5)

0.50%

2.50%

1.50%

1.30%

0.70%

1,240,000

99,400,000

24,000,000

4,386,000

33,900,000

% Reorganized Equity (n=10)

1.00%

7.50%

3.75%

3.50%

2.12%

% Total Enterprise Value (n=9)

0.27%

3.15%

1.92%

1.69%

1.15%

% Funded Debt (n=9)

0.18%

2.86%

1.37%

1.45%

0.89%

Equity (n=10)*
Value of Equity (n=9)

* In six cases, warrants and equity were distributed outside of the absolute priority rule, so the total value of the distribution was higher.
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tent with what one would expect if junior activists positively
influenced the governance of bankrupt firms by constraining
opportunistic underappraisals.
On the other hand, some evidence supported the contentions of the critics of junior activism. Payments outside of the
absolute priority rule were observed in 27 percent of sample
cases. However, the value distributed outside of the absolute
priority rule was relatively small (generally ranging between
1-3 percent of the appraised transaction value). Table 2 on
p. 29 summarizes distributions outside of the absolute priority rule. It seems unlikely that these small settlements would
make the investment that junior activists make in lawyer and
investment banker fees profitable, which suggests that hedge
funds would be unlikely to litigate opportunistically in search
of these small observed payments.
Evidence was also found that suggests that junior activist litigation is associated with higher attorneys’ fees, which
makes intuitive sense. After all, if junior activists are filing
objections, the debtor’s attorneys will incur additional fees
in responding to them and preparing for trial. However, the
magnitude of the implied cost increase is relatively low, and
direct bankruptcy costs themselves are a mere 1.3 percent
of the appraised value of the median sample case. In addition, a relationship between junior activism and the length
of the bankruptcy case was not observable, which mitigates
the worry of critics that overly litigious hedge funds prolong
bankruptcy cases.

Conclusion

The results of the study support both the claims of junior
activists and the claims of their detractors. On the whole, the
findings are inconsistent with the claim that activist investors
buy junior claims and abuse the bankruptcy system to extract
hold-up payments. No evidence was found of large payments outside of the absolute priority rule, and junior activists appear to focus their efforts on relatively more valuable
cases, inconsistent with the expectation of indiscriminate liti-

gation. Moreover, the study found evidence suggesting that
junior activism is correlated with unexpectedly high creditor
recoveries and other corroborating evidence that supports the
view that junior activists contribute expertise to bankruptcy
cases that lead to better outcomes.

[T]he results in the study shift
the burden of proof onto the
critics of junior activism to show
that there is a problem with
overly litigious hedge funds
abusing the bankruptcy system,
but further research is needed
to learn more about the impact
that hedge funds might have on
the bankruptcy process[.]
However, it is important to qualify these results by noting
that the methodology used in the study could not eliminate
the possibility that the observed positive correlation between
junior activism and the final appraisal is better explained as
a non-random and savvy selection of target firms by sophisticated investors. It does seem unlikely that junior activists
would correctly identify undervalued firms and then reduce
their returns by the millions of dollars they spend on lawyers
and investment bankers to participate in the process, but the
results from the data cannot conclusively reject this possibility.
Nonetheless, the results in the study shift the burden of proof
onto the critics of junior activism to show that there is a problem with overly litigious hedge funds abusing the bankruptcy
system, but further research is needed to learn more about the
impact that hedge funds might have on the bankruptcy process.
The results in this study cautiously suggest that junior activist
investing strategies might be, on average, beneficial. abi
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